Debtor filed a complaint seeking to discharge her student loans based on a theory of undue hardship. Debtor, who is participating in an income based repayment plan, based her undue hardship complaint primarily on the potential tax consequences that may arise if the balance of her student loan debt is discharged at the end of her repayment term. Based on Debtor’s interrogatory responses, in which she appeared to concede that she could afford her monthly repayment obligation, Defendant sought summary judgment on the ground that Debtor cannot satisfy the Brunner test. Defendant is entitled to partial summary judgment that the potential tax consequences of student loan debt forgiveness, by themselves, are not enough to render the debt dischargeable. Because Debtor’s response to the summary judgment motion raised genuine issues of material fact about whether Debtor can afford her monthly repayment obligation, the balance of the motion is denied.

Debtors and their mortgage lender disputed whether the Court should follow a 10^th Circuit BAP decision and hold that, per 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3), Debtors’ stay terminated only with respect to actions taken against the Debtors, or whether the Court should follow case law in other circuits holding that the stay terminated with respect to estate property as well. The Court determined (1) that 10^th Circuit BAP decisions, while persuasive, cannot bind bankruptcy courts within the circuit, and (2) that based on statutory interpretation and bankruptcy policy, the stay did not terminate with respect to estate property.

In connection with their divorce, Plaintiff Heather McDonald and Debtor/Defendant Stephen McDonald entered into a marriage settlement agreement (“MSA)” in which Debtor agreed to assume certain debts (the “Debts”). Debtor thereafter filed Bankruptcy Case No. 20-10755 and ultimately the Court granted Debtor a discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727. When Debtor did not pay the Debts, Plaintiff filed an adversary complaint seeking a determination that the Debts are non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15). The Court held that, although Debtor’s obligations to the creditors were discharged under § 727, his obligations to Plaintiff under the MSA were not, and that, pursuant to the MSA, Plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement of the amounts paid on Debtor’s behalf. The Court also granted in part Plaintiff’s request for costs and ordered Debtor to pay a portion of the filing fee for the adversary proceeding.

Chapter 7 trustee sought to recover approximately $1.2 million transfers taken as shareholder distributions by defendants who were the owners of Debtor—a consumer lending and retail furniture business—on the theory that the business was insolvent in the two-year prepetition period during which the distributions were made.  Finding no evidence that business was on its “deathbed” during the transfer period, the Court rejected the trustee’s argument that the fair value of Debtor’s assets was their liquidation value as opposed to their going concern value.  Holding that the trustee failed to carry the burden of proving Debtor’s insolvency during the transfer period, the Court entered judgment in favor of the defendants