Sixteen months after filing their original complaint, six months after the close of discovery, and with eleven fully-briefed motions for partial summary judgment pending before the Court, Plaintiffs in this heavily litigated adversary proceeding filed a motion to amend their complaint seeking to add a negligence claim  (having originally pleaded professional negligence), drop a civil conspiracy claim, add three plaintiffs, and amend the factual allegations. Defendants objected. The Court, having addressed Plaintiffs’ negligence claim in its opinion granting summary judgment to defendants on professional negligence, and noting that Plaintiffs offered no explanation for the delay in seeking to add a new claim, held that the request was untimely and futile. Plaintiffs request to add new plaintiffs was untimely made, and would otherwise be futile—the additional plaintiffs lacked standing, they did not suffer damages attributable to Defendants’ conduct, and they were strangers to the underlying transaction. Amending the factual allegations would also be futile considering the advanced stage of proceedings.  On these grounds, and to avoid undue prejudice to the Defendants, the motion is denied except to  the extent that Plaintiffs seek to drop the civil conspiracy claim.

Debtor, formerly a successful neurologist, filed chapter 7 bankruptcy after losing his medical license, being sued for wrongful death arising from prescription drug overdose deaths of two of his patients, and divorcing from his wife. Two wrongful death plaintiffs filed claims in the bankruptcy case. The UST filed this adversary proceeding objecting to Debtor’s discharge under various provisions of Section 727(a).  The chapter 7 trustee subsequently filed an adversary proceeding seeking to avoid alleged fraudulent transfers from Debtor to his wife and son. The chapter 7 trustee, the fraudulent transfer defendants, and the two claimants reached a settlement agreement resolving the chapter 7 trustee’s adversary proceeding, and leaving the estate with no unpaid creditors. Based on the settlement agreement, Debtor filed a motion for summary judgment asking the Court to grant his discharge as a matter of “discretion” and, in the alternative, seeking dismissal of the UST’s complaint as moot.  The Court held the UST’s complaint is not moot because discharge is a significant privilege reserved for honest debtors, and the UST is charged with protecting the integrity of the bankruptcy code. The Court also held that it does not have discretion to grant debtor a discharge if the UST can prove that Debtor’s conduct satisfies one of the enumerated exceptions to discharge stated in Section 707(a). Debtor’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

Debtor moved for sanctions and/or a finding of contempt against Debtor’s former employee for violation of the automatic stay. The Court found that Debtor’s structure as a corporation sole meant that employee’s post-petition suit against the Archbishop was stayed, but sanctions were inappropriate given the rarity of and the lack of authority on the issue.

After a trial on the merits to determine the ownership of mineral rights as between the probate estates of a mother and son, the Court concluded that the disputed mineral rights are owned by the probate estate of the son.  In a 1996 deed, stating no reservations or exceptions of any mineral interests, Hipolito Franco’s parents conveyed 122 acres of property to him.  In 1998 Hipolito and his wife used the surface estate of property as collateral for a loan.  A survey of the property revealed an error in the metes and bounds description of the property in the 1996 deed.  The lender’s title commitment required a correction deed, which Hipolito’s mother (then widowed) signed.  The metes and bounds description in the correction deed was preceded by the phrase “surface estate only.” Relying on the “surface estate only” language in the correction deed and on other legally-ineffective documentation, Hipolito’s mother claimed ownership of the mineral rights for several years, while omitting them from her bankruptcy schedules in two chapter 7 cases.  A state court quiet title action pertaining to the mineral rights filed by Hipolito and his wife was removed to this court.  By the time a trial on the merits of ownership of the disputed mineral rights was held, Hipolito and his mother had died.  The Court held that the disputed mineral rights were conveyed to Hipolito in the 1996 deed.  The correction deed did not alter the nature of that conveyance.  Hipolito’s estate was not estopped from claiming ownership of the disputed minerals.  Principles of estoppel by deed and judicial estoppel would preclude his mother’s estate from claiming ownership of the disputed minerals.