Opinions
All court opinions may be accessed at no charge via PACER through the "Written Opinions" link on the Reports page. You must, however, have an account to access the report via CM/ECF or PACER.
Access to opinions from 1997 to present, that are PDF searchable, unrestricted & unsealed, are also available through the Government Printing Office using the Advanced Search for Government Publications. There is no login required and publications are available free of charge.
Court Opinions Database
The court's provides free access of some opinions, at the discretion of the judges, for the years 1998 to present. The results shown below are automatically displayed for all years, all judges, and all keywords/topics.
A search may be performed using the Search box above, or filtering by year, judge, and/or keyword/topic. To search for more than one judge and/or keywords/topics simultaneously, hold down the Ctrl key (or Command key) and select each item.
Keywords/Topic | Date | Title | Description | Judge | |
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Adversary, Avoidance Actions, Fraudulent Transfers, Preference | 08/06/2021 | Philip J. Montoya v. Margaret Dubbin |
Trustee sought to avoid repayment of Debtor’s 401(k) loan on the eve of bankruptcy as preferential and/or fraudulent, and Debtors moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that there were no transactions and no debtor/creditor relationship created between a debtor and her retirement plan. Following Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991); In re Buchferer, 216 B.R. 332 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997); and BAPCPA, the Court held that nonrecourse loans can establish a debtor/creditor relationship, that the conversion of non-exempt to exempt assets can form the basis of a § 548 claim, and that borrowing from one’s 401(k) plan is much more complex than borrowing from oneself. Thus, at the motion to dismiss stage, the trustee has pleaded claims for which relief may be granted. |
Judge David T. Thuma | |
Summary Judgment | 08/05/2021 | WBL SPE II, LLC v. APSCO, INC., et al |
Plaintiff sought a judgment that two promissory notes (the “Notes”) and two mortgages (the “Mortgages”) securing the Notes are valid and enforceable against Jesse Lane Properties, LLC (“JLP”) and its Property, including that Debtor Belenda M. Lane had either actual or apparent authority to execute such contracts on behalf of JLP. During the negotiations for the first promissory note, the lender received an opinion letter, purportedly from an attorney, in which the author represented that Ms. Lane had authority to execute the first note and mortgage on behalf of JLP. The purported opinion letter did not contain the usual elements of opinion letters by attorneys. The Court found that genuine disputes of material facts persist as to 1) whether Ms. Lane acted in whole or in part for the benefit of JLP, and therefore within the scope of her actual authority, when she executed the Notes and Mortgages and 2) whether it was reasonable for Plaintiff to rely on Ms. Lane’s representations of her authority after it received the purported opinion letter. The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and, under Rule 7056(g) and pursuant to Plaintiff’s request, deemed the facts not in genuine dispute set forth in the Court’s opinion to be established for all purposes in this case, including for trial.sum |
Chief Judge Robert H. Jacobvitz | |
Chapter 13, Dischargeability, Issue Preclusion | 08/05/2021 | Sergejev v. Alderman |
The Court granted Plaintiff’s supplemental motion for summary judgment determining that a state court award of attorneys’ fees was entitled to preclusive effect and was appropriately included as part of the non-dischargeable judgment attributable to Defendants’ non-dischargeable conduct under § 523(a)(6). The state court entered a separate judgment for attorneys’ fees following entry of a damages judgment after trial. The Court determined that Defendants had a full and fair opportunity to litigate whether Plaintiff was entitled to attorneys’ fees at the trial in which Defendants failed to appear. The Court determined further that Defendants were not entitled to attorneys’ fees under § 523(d), which applies only to claims under § 523(a)(2). Plaintiff’s complaint included claims under both § 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6) based on the same conduct and the same state court judgment; the Court granted judgment under § 523(a)(6) only; and Defendants had to defend the claim under § 523(a)(6) regardless of Plaintiff’s additional claim asserted under § 523(a)(2). |
Chief Judge Robert H. Jacobvitz | |
Automatic Stay | 08/04/2021 | Kathryn Lovato |
The Court denied creditor’s request for relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d)(1) and § 362(d)(4). Debtor filed a prior chapter 7 case six years earlier, failed to disclose a second rental property on two loan modification applications submitted to creditor, made only one payment on the two loan modifications, and filed a second bankruptcy case under chapter 13 on the eve of a scheduled foreclosure trial. Creditor asserted that debtor intentionally undervalued the property subject to the creditor’s second lien in her bankruptcy schedules so that she could seek to strip off creditor’s mortgage through her chapter 13 plan. The Court could not determine the value of the property because creditor’s appraiser made an extraordinary assumption concerning the property’s condition. The Court determined that debtor’s conduct did not rise to the level of bad faith necessary to constitute “cause” for relief from the stay under § 362(d)(1) and did not evidence a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud creditor sufficient to grant in rem stay relief under § 362(d)(4). Debtor’s schedules showed changed circumstances in her financial condition, and property valuation would be determined at confirmation.
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Chief Judge Robert H. Jacobvitz | |
Attorneys Fees, Costs of Litigation, Discovery, Fees, Reconsideration | 07/29/2021 | Barry J. Byrnes v. Sylvia Marie Byrnes |
Two days after the court’s entry of a protective order which, inter alia, ordered Plaintiff to pay the attorney fees incurred by Defendant in connection with the motion for a protective order, the Plaintiff filed a motion seeking reconsideration. Plaintiff’s reasons for seeking reconsideration are not well taken, and the motion is denied. Plaintiff, who is bordering on becoming a vexatious litigant, is admonished to comply with the governing rules of procedure, to curb his overly aggressive litigation tactics, and to conduct himself with the appropriate level of decorum required for court proceedings. |
Judge David T. Thuma | |
Appeals, Automatic Stay, Relief from Stay | 07/23/2021 | Victor P. Kearney |
Debtor filed a motion for an order instructing the New Mexico Court of Appeals that the automatic stay does not prevent it from resolving pending appeals from a state district court order. The automatic stay was previously modified to allow the state district court to rule on the matters at issue in the pending appeals. When the Court modified the automatic stay to allow the state district court to rule, it did not intend to deny any party the right to appeal an adverse ruling. Although the stay modification order was silent on this point, the order implicitly and necessarily included the right to appeal. The Court granted Debtor’s motion accordingly. |
Judge David T. Thuma | |
Chapter 11, Contract Interpretation, Sales of Assets | 07/19/2021 | Sandia Tobacco Manufacturers, Inc. |
Debtor, a non-participating tobacco product manufacturer (“NPM”) under the Master Settlement Agreement between various settling states and major tobacco product manufacturers, sought to sell its rights to receive the interest earned and residual amounts remaining twenty-five years after deposit in qualified escrow accounts established under state escrow statutes applicable to NPMs. The Court denied the motion and the related motions to approve auction procedures and to assume and assign escrow agreements concluding that Debtor had already assigned the rights at issue under a Supply Agreement for the manufacture of tobacco products for distribution and sale by another tobacco business. Debtor’s rejection of the Supply Agreement had no effect on the rights already assigned through allocation under the Supply Agreement.
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Chief Judge Robert H. Jacobvitz | |
Adversary, Avoidance Actions, Fraudulent Transfers, Preference, Property of the Estate | 07/16/2021 | Philip J. Montoya v. Paula Goldstein et al |
Trustee sought to avoid payments made on a promissory note to Debtor’s principal’s mother as preferential and/or fraudulent. After a trial on the merits, the Court finds in favor of defendants on all counts because the defendants put much more money into Debtor than they took out and because some of the funds were earmarked by guarantors to pay the mother specifically, and so therefore were not property of the estate. |
Judge David T. Thuma | |
Chapter 11, Contract Interpretation, Executory Contract | 07/12/2021 | S-Tek 1, LLC |
Debtor sought to reject a pre-petition settlement agreement as an executory contract. The Court determined that the release provisions in the settlement agreement were effective upon payment of the settlement amount to Debtor and that rejection of the settlement agreement would not undo the releases to allow Debtor to resume its claims against the settling party. The Court deferred its determination of whether the settlement agreement remains executory based on mutual non-disparagement provisions. The Court did not need to decide whether a provision in the settlement agreement rendered the entire agreement unenforceable as against public policy because the settlement agreement contained a severability provision. |
Chief Judge Robert H. Jacobvitz | |
Adversary, Dismissal, Divorce/Separation, Nondischargeability | 07/02/2021 | Barry J. Byrnes v. Sylvia Marie Byrnes |
Plaintiff, the estranged husband of Defendant/Debtor filed an adversary proceeding seeking a determination that certain alleged support obligations are nondischargeable in Debtor’s chapter 7 bankruptcy. The parties are married. Though they are living separately, they are not legally separated nor has either filed for divorce. In Count Two of his amended complaint, Plaintiff sought an order from this Court (1) determining Debtor’s domestic support obligations to him, and (2) declaring those obligations nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. Section 523(a)(5), (6), (7), and (15). Debtor moved to dismiss Count Two for failure to state a claim. The Court holds that that marital support obligations are the exclusive province of the state court. Without a court-issued marital settlement agreement, domestic support order, separation agreement, etc., Plaintiff cannot state a claim under Section 523(a)(5) or (a)(15). Nor do the allegations in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint state a viable claim under 523(a)(6) or (a)(7). Debtor’s motion to dismiss is granted. |
Judge David T. Thuma |