Opinions

 

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Court Opinions Database

The court's provides free access of some opinions, at the discretion of the judges, for the years 1998 to present. The results shown below are automatically displayed for all years, all judges, and all keywords/topics.

A search may be performed using the Search box above, or filtering by year, judge, and/or keyword/topic. To search for more than one judge and/or keywords/topics simultaneously, hold down the Ctrl key (or Command key) and select each item.

Keywords/Topic Date Title Description Judge
Cause, Chapter 13, Standing, Statutory Construction, Valuation     12/23/2020     Sandra Joyce McGrath and Dale Allen Rogers     

Debtors’ mortgage holder moved for relief from the automatic stay, citing several ground for relief under § 362(d). The Court denied the motion and notably ruled that, because Debtors mortgage matured prior to bankruptcy, Debtors could potentially amend their plan to bifurcate and cramdown the movant’s claim and/or pay the claim via a balloon payment at the end of Debtors’ plan period.

 

Judge David T. Thuma
Automatic Stay, Chapter 11, Injunctions, Sanctions, Stay Violation     12/14/2020     Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe     

Debtor moved for sanctions and/or a finding of contempt against Debtor’s former employee for violation of the automatic stay. The Court found that Debtor’s structure as a corporation sole meant that employee’s post-petition suit against the Archbishop was stayed, but sanctions were inappropriate given the rarity of and the lack of authority on the issue.

 

Judge David T. Thuma
Chapter 11     12/11/2020     S-Tek 1, LLC, a New Mexico Limited Liability Corporation     

The Court granted the debtor’s request for use of cash collateral on an emergency basis, pending a final hearing on use of cash collateral. Before the bankruptcy filing, the debtor filed a lawsuit in state court against Surv-Tek, Inc., the business entity from which the debtor purchased its business.  Surv-Tek, Inc. filed a counter-claim and obtained a judgment from the state court ordering the debtor and its principals to cease and desist competing with Surv-Tek, Inc. The Court determined that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents a state court loser from seeking federal court review and rejection of the state court judgment, did not preclude the debtor from seeking an order for use of cash collateral in a subsequent bankruptcy case. In addition, the automatic stay precluded enforcement of the state court order. Surv-Tek, Inc. was granted adequate protection in the form of a replacement lien in property of the same time it had a lien on the petition date that the debtor acquired post-petition to the extent the combined value of the debtor’s accounts receivable, cash on hand, and other cash equivalents, was less at the end of the interim, emergency period, than the value of those assets on the petition date. 

 

Chief Judge Robert H. Jacobvitz
Adversary, Equitable Estoppel, Judicial Estoppel     12/11/2020     Celia Hougland v. Carlo Franco et al     

After a trial on the merits to determine the ownership of mineral rights as between the probate estates of a mother and son, the Court concluded that the disputed mineral rights are owned by the probate estate of the son.  In a 1996 deed, stating no reservations or exceptions of any mineral interests, Hipolito Franco’s parents conveyed 122 acres of property to him.  In 1998 Hipolito and his wife used the surface estate of property as collateral for a loan.  A survey of the property revealed an error in the metes and bounds description of the property in the 1996 deed.  The lender’s title commitment required a correction deed, which Hipolito’s mother (then widowed) signed.  The metes and bounds description in the correction deed was preceded by the phrase “surface estate only.” Relying on the “surface estate only” language in the correction deed and on other legally-ineffective documentation, Hipolito’s mother claimed ownership of the mineral rights for several years, while omitting them from her bankruptcy schedules in two chapter 7 cases.  A state court quiet title action pertaining to the mineral rights filed by Hipolito and his wife was removed to this court.  By the time a trial on the merits of ownership of the disputed mineral rights was held, Hipolito and his mother had died.  The Court held that the disputed mineral rights were conveyed to Hipolito in the 1996 deed.  The correction deed did not alter the nature of that conveyance.  Hipolito’s estate was not estopped from claiming ownership of the disputed minerals.  Principles of estoppel by deed and judicial estoppel would preclude his mother’s estate from claiming ownership of the disputed minerals.          

 

Judge David T. Thuma
Exemptions     12/07/2020     Mary Suarez     

The chapter 7 trustee objected to Debtor’s claim of a homestead exemption in her residence on the ground that, having given a warranty deed, absolute in form, to the property to her daughter’s trust, Debtor no longer owns the property and the property is not part of the estate. Debtor asserted that, the warranty deed notwithstanding, she has an interest in the property that she may exempt from the bankruptcy estate under New Mexico law. The chapter 7 trustee did not dispute that Debtor and her daughter, as trustee of the Trust, had an oral agreement that Debtor could live in the property until her death. The Court concluded that the terms of the oral agreement did not merge into the warranty deed, that the oral agreement is enforceable despite the statute of frauds under the circumstances, and that, under the oral agreement, Debtor had a life estate interest that became part of the estate and is exemptible under New Mexico law.

 

Chief Judge Robert H. Jacobvitz
Exemptions, Property of the Estate, Trustee     12/07/2020     Mary Suarez     

The chapter 7 trustee objected to Debtor’s claim of a homestead exemption in her residence on the ground that, having given a warranty deed, absolute in form, to the property to her daughter’s trust, Debtor no longer owns the property and the property is not part of the estate. Debtor asserted that, the warranty deed notwithstanding, she has an interest in the property that she may exempt from the bankruptcy estate under New Mexico law. The chapter 7 trustee did not dispute that Debtor and her daughter, as trustee of the Trust, had an oral agreement that Debtor could live in the property until her death. The Court concluded that the terms of the oral agreement did not merge into the warranty deed, that the oral agreement is enforceable despite the statute of frauds under the circumstances, and that, under the oral agreement, Debtor had a life estate interest that became part of the estate and is exemptible under New Mexico law.

 

Chief Judge Robert H. Jacobvitz
Automatic Stay     12/02/2020     Cheryl Thorp     

Creditors failed to satisfy their burden of establishing Debtor’s lack of equity   in property, but were entitled to relief from the automatic stay for “cause” based on the totality of the surrounding facts and circumstances. Debtor filed three prior   bankruptcy cases, had not made any payments to the creditors in four years, and appealed a state court foreclosure judgment without posting a supersedeas bond. Creditor’s lien   and right of first refusal contained in an agreement executed by the Debtor to obtain the property under the City of Santa Fe’s affordable housing opportunity program constituted an encumbrance against the property which survived the Debtor’s prior discharge, and,  assuming the agreement was an executory contract, rejection of the agreement did not terminate the contract. 

Chief Judge Robert H. Jacobvitz
Attorneys Fees, Judicial Liens - Avoidance, Professionals, Valuation     11/25/2020     Rito Bill Sanchez     

Debtor moved for the avoidance of a judicial lien encumbering his property. The Court ruled that on the petition date, Debtor’s house was worth less than the New Mexico homestead exemption, so the lien could be avoided entirely. Further, it would be a violation of the New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct for the lienholder, Debtor’s former attorney, to collect the judgment, as it was an unreasonable fee consisting primarily of accrued interest.

 

 

Judge David T. Thuma
Conversion, Trustee, Valuation     11/20/2020     Roy Mitchell Waggoner and Jewel Kay Waggoner     

Chapter 7 trustee sought order compelling debtor to turn over three pieces of irrigation equipment that trustee claimed was part of the bankruptcy estate.  The Court held a trial on the merits and concluded that the trustee’s motion for turnover must be denied. Under Section 348(f)(1)(A) equipment acquired by debtor during chapter 13 case prior to conversion to chapter 7 was not property of chapter 7 estate, and therefore not subject to turnover. Equipment that debtor acquired and disposed of prepetition was not property of the chapter 13 or chapter 7 estate, and therefore was not subject to turnover. Equipment that debtor sold prepetition, retained possession of after the conversion date, and delivered to the buyer during chapter 7 case was property of chapter 7 estate subject to turnover, but because evidence of the property’s value was insufficient and the whereabouts of the equipment is unknown, neither the equipment nor its value could be turned over to trustee.  

Judge David T. Thuma
Adversary, Damages, Default Judgment, Nondischargeability, Punitive Damages     11/06/2020     Gretchen Welch v. David Tracy Giron     

Plaintiff sued Defendant for declaration that damages resulting from Defendant’s clouding of Plaintiff’s title, liquidated in a California state court default judgment, were nondischargeable under §§ 523(a)(2), (4), or (6). The Court did not determine the default judgment nondischargeable, but instead found and concluded that Defendant’s actions were willful and malicious, and that actual proved damages and $25,000 in punitive damages were therefore nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).

 

Judge David T. Thuma

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