Plaintiff sought to alter or amend the judgment denying defendant’s discharge pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) and the Court’s §105 equitable powers to increase the amount of a monetary judgment relating to plaintiff’s non-dischargeability claims. Plaintiff’s non-dischargeability claims were based on the same conduct that resulted in a state court judgment.  Claim preclusion principles barred the Court from changing the amount of the non-dischargeable debt represented by the state court judgment in a subsequent non-dischargeability proceeding.    The Court was required to give full faith and credit to the state court judgment, and, under Illinois law, the state court judgment was entitled to preclusive effect. 

Debtor moved to reject settlement agreement with a homeowner's association pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(a).  The settlement agreement required the Debtor to convey property and the HOA to release its claims against Debtor.  Neither had occurred as of the petition date.  The Court held that the settlement agreement was an executory contract because both parties had material unperformed obligations.  The fact that the HOA's obligation was contingent and self-executing did not change the result, as the mechanism for performance does not determine executoriness.  

Debtor sought to establish on summary judgment that creditor's claim for wages or contract payables was not entitled to priority under § 507(a)(4).  Creditor argued that even though she was terminated more than 180 days before the petition date, the wages or contract payables were "earned" within that period because the payment was due about 150 days prepetition.  The Court overruled this argument and found that employees "earn" wages within the meaning of  § 507(a)(4) when the services are performed, not at the time of payment.

On cross motions for summary judgment, the Court determined that 1) the language in the Debtor-Hospital’s confirmed Chapter 11 plan was broad enough to enjoin claims against former employees of the Debtor-Hospital relating to claims against the Debtor-Hospital and has res judicata effect even if such third-party injunction is contrary to the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code;  2) that Plaintiff received actual notice of the commencement of the bankruptcy case, the hearing on confirmation of the Chapter 11 plan, and the deadline for filing administrative claims; and 3) fact issues concerning whether the content of the notice was sufficient to satisfy due process and bind plaintiff to the injunction contained in the Confirmed Chapter 11 plan precluded summary judgment.