United States Bankruptcy Court District of New Mexico

Document Verification

Case Title: Yvette J. Gonzales v. Peoples Bank, et al.

Case Number: 01-01166

Nature of Suit:

Judge Code: S

Reference Number: 01-01166 - S

Document Information

Number: 12

Description: Memorandum Opinion re: [4-1] Motion To Dismiss Adversary Proceeding by Peoples

Bank.

Size: 7 pages (16k)

Date 11/14/2001 | **Date Filed:** 11/14/2001 | **Date Entered On Docket:** 11/16/2001

Received: 01:26:11 PM

Court Digital Signature

5d 2d 73 c1 d4 df f2 ff ab 12 e2 b5 9b 1e b8 31 33 67 71 3a 7a 17 b3 50 6b 02 ce 34 20 94 e8 28 7d cb 23 ac 0f 88 e1 2b 7b f7 2f 02 67 c7 3f 0a 76 31 34 da 6c 6d 68 e0 84 4f 96 f4 c7 ce 4e ba b3 89 45 49 63 7c ce c8 7d 5d 59 29 61 ff 71 dc 9b 94 fc bd 01 0a 5a aa 61 5a d0 8b 05 a2 95 72 c2 f8 25 d4 b1 ac f5 b0 c6 1e 40 d6 7f 89 1c 7a c3 78 97 f8 b0 de 0d f5 d8 de d0 01 4e bc c1 53

Filer Information

Submitted By:

Comments: Memorandum Opinion on Motion to Dismiss

Digital Signature: The Court's digital signature is a verifiable mathematical computation unique to this document and the Court's private encryption key. This signature assures that any change to the document can be detected.

Verification: This form is verification of the status of the document identified above as of *Monday, June 6, 2005*. If this form is attached to the document identified above, it serves as an endorsed copy of the document.

Note: Any date shown above is current as of the date of this verification. Users are urged to review the official court docket for a specific event to confirm information, such as entered on docket date for purposes of appeal. Any element of information on this form, except for the digital signature and the received date, is subject to change as changes may be entered on the Court's official docket.

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

In re:
David McCaughey Brown,
Debtor.

No. 7-01-12228 SS

Yvette J. Gonzales, as Chapter 7 Trustee, Plaintiff,

vs.

Peoples Bank,
Defendant

Adv. No. 01-1166 S

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter came before the Court on the Motion to
Dismiss filed by Defendant Peoples Bank, through its attorney
Alexia Constantaras. Plaintiff is represented by James Askew.
This is a core proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(F).
Plaintiff's complaint originally contained three counts; two
counts have been dismissed by stipulation of the parties,
leaving only a count for recovery of a preferential transfer
under 11 U.S.C. § 547. Plaintiff asserts in the remaining
count that the failure of Peoples Bank to have had in its
possession the additional shares of Sun Microsystems stock
prior to the ninety days immediately preceding the filing of
the petition, or to have filed a financing statement,
constitutes the preferential transfer.

Defendant has moved for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as incorporated into Bankruptcy Rule 7012(b).

"[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 335 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, 444 U.S. 232, 246, 100 S.Ct. 502, 511, 62 L.Ed.2d 441 (1980). In adjudicating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7012(b), which incorporates Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a bankruptcy court must assume all facts alleged in the complaint to be true. <u>In re Garafano</u>, 99 B.R. 624 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989). Under this standard, dismissal is inappropriate unless plaintiff can prove no set of Kelpe, 98 B.R. 479, 480 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989); In re Smurzynski, 72 B.R. 368, 370 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1987).

Lawrence National Bank v. Edmonds (In re Edmonds), 924 F.2d 176, 180 (10th Cir. 1991).

To state a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 547, the Trustee must prove:

- a transfer of an interest of the debtor in property
- (1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
- (2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by
- the debtor before such transfer was made;
- (3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
- (4) made -
 - (A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
 - (B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and

- (5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if -
 - (A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
 - (B) the transfer had not been made; and
 - (C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the provisions of this title.

11 U.S.C. § 547(b). The complaint in this case alleges a transfer of a stock certificate (Complaint ¶¶ 10, 11); to a creditor (¶¶ 5, 6, 7, 8); made while the debtor was insolvent¹ (¶¶ 13); made within 90 days before the date of the petition (¶¶ 2, 11); that enables defendant to receive more than it would otherwise receive in this case (¶ 14). Plaintiff has stated a claim for relief under section 547, so the Motion to Dismiss should be denied.

The certificate for the additional shares of stock in question was delivered to the Debtor at some point before February 1, 2001, and then delivered to Peoples Bank on February 27, 2001. The Debtor filed his petition on March 30, 2001. Defendant's argument focuses on the nature of the stock certificate and its transfer, claiming that because it represented a stock split, that is, a mere re-unitization of an ownership interest in Sun Microsystems, the transfer of the

 $^{^{\}rm 1}$ Debtor is also presumed to be insolvent for the 90 days immediately preceding the petition by virtue of 11 U.S.C. § $547({\rm f})\,.$

certificate to the Bank cannot be a preference as a matter of law. The Court disagrees.

Having a lien on a share of stock is an entirely different matter than being perfected in that share of stock by possession. The Court assumes, without ruling, that Defendant had a perfected lien on the original stock certificate and had a lien on the certificate representing the split shares. When the latter went to the Debtor, however, Defendant was not in control of that certificate and not perfected in it. <u>See</u> Section 55-9-115(4) NMSA 1978 (1997 Repl.²)("Perfection of a security interest in investment property is governed by the following rules: (a) ... by control; (b) ... by filing.") The comments make it clear that either control or filing suffice to perfect the interest of the secured party. In this instance, however, the Bank had not "filed" a financing statement. Nor did it have possession ("control") of the certificate upon issuance or within ten days thereafter, meaning that the Bank's continuing perfection in the proceeds of the original certificate, that is, in the newly issued shares arising from the stock split, lapsed.

² The Court has not applied the provisions of Revised Article 9, which became effective in New Mexico on July 1, 2001.

Defendant then became perfected within the preference period when it obtained possession of the certificate on February 27. This is precisely the type of situation in which section 547 applies. See Boberschmidt v. Society National Bank (In re Jones), 226 F.3d 917, 921-22 (7th Cir. 2000) (Payment of proceeds from a foreclosure of an unperfected security interest is a preferential transfer.); Matter of <u>Vitreous Steel Products Company</u>, 911 F.2d 1223, 1235 (7th Cir. 1990) ("By taking the transfer of the goods not covered in the financing statement (i.e., by perfecting its security interest), the Bank improved its position by that increment."); FDIC v. W. Hugh Meyer & Associates, Inc., 864 F.2d 371, 375 (5th Cir. 1989)("[T]he relevant decisions do seem to assume that physical delivery is necessary to create a secured interest in certificated securities under the relevant provisions of Article 8.")(Applying Texas law, holding that Bank was not perfected in stock dividends on pledged stock that were paid to debtor. Id. at 372.)

The Code specifically mandates this result in §547, and therefore equity considerations do not override this conclusion. Depletion of the estate is not an explicit requirement for a cause of action under §547, although perhaps it may be incorporated indirectly into the provisions of

§547(b)(5); nevertheless, the estate as it existed on February 26 was depleted by the transfer that took place on February 27. And <u>In re Whitaker</u> is not apposite, since in that case the stock split took place after the petition had been filed, so that the F.D.I.C. was perfected on the date of the filing of the petition.

Defendant's motion to dismiss incorporates some factual matters outside the pleadings, which the Court has disregarded. It is inappropriate for a court to consider matters outside of the pleadings when ruling on a motion to dismiss, unless the Court converts the motion into one for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Edmonds, 924 F.2d at 180. The Court did not treat this motion as a motion for summary judgment.

For the above reasons, the Court will enter an Order Denying the Motion to Dismiss.

Honorable James S. Starzynski United States Bankruptcy Judge I hereby certify that on November 14, 2001, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was either electronically transmitted, faxed, delivered, or mailed to the listed counsel and parties.

James A. Askew PO Box 1888 Albuquerque, NM 87103-1888

Alexia Constantaras PO Box 4160 Santa Fe, NM 87502-4160

Office of the United States Trustee PO Box 608 Albuquerque, NM 87103-0608

James F. Burke_