Opinions

 

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Court Opinions Database

The court's provides free access of some opinions, at the discretion of the judges, for the years 1998 to present. The results shown below are automatically displayed for all years, all judges, and all keywords/topics.

A search may be performed using the Search box above, or filtering by year, judge, and/or keyword/topic. To search for more than one judge and/or keywords/topics simultaneously, hold down the Ctrl key (or Command key) and select each item.

Keywords/Topic Date Title Description Judge
Adversary     01/29/2021     Edward Mazel et al v. Las Cruces Abstract and Title Company et al     

Sixteen months after filing their original complaint, six months after the close of discovery, and with eleven fully-briefed motions for partial summary judgment pending before the Court, Plaintiffs in this heavily litigated adversary proceeding filed a motion to amend their complaint seeking to add a negligence claim  (having originally pleaded professional negligence), drop a civil conspiracy claim, add three plaintiffs, and amend the factual allegations. Defendants objected. The Court, having addressed Plaintiffs’ negligence claim in its opinion granting summary judgment to defendants on professional negligence, and noting that Plaintiffs offered no explanation for the delay in seeking to add a new claim, held that the request was untimely and futile. Plaintiffs request to add new plaintiffs was untimely made, and would otherwise be futile—the additional plaintiffs lacked standing, they did not suffer damages attributable to Defendants’ conduct, and they were strangers to the underlying transaction. Amending the factual allegations would also be futile considering the advanced stage of proceedings.  On these grounds, and to avoid undue prejudice to the Defendants, the motion is denied except to  the extent that Plaintiffs seek to drop the civil conspiracy claim.

 

Judge David T. Thuma
Adversary, Discharge, Fraudulent Transfers, Settlement, Summary Judgment     01/22/2021     United States Trustee v. Pawankumar Jain     

Debtor, formerly a successful neurologist, filed chapter 7 bankruptcy after losing his medical license, being sued for wrongful death arising from prescription drug overdose deaths of two of his patients, and divorcing from his wife. Two wrongful death plaintiffs filed claims in the bankruptcy case. The UST filed this adversary proceeding objecting to Debtor’s discharge under various provisions of Section 727(a).  The chapter 7 trustee subsequently filed an adversary proceeding seeking to avoid alleged fraudulent transfers from Debtor to his wife and son. The chapter 7 trustee, the fraudulent transfer defendants, and the two claimants reached a settlement agreement resolving the chapter 7 trustee’s adversary proceeding, and leaving the estate with no unpaid creditors. Based on the settlement agreement, Debtor filed a motion for summary judgment asking the Court to grant his discharge as a matter of “discretion” and, in the alternative, seeking dismissal of the UST’s complaint as moot.  The Court held the UST’s complaint is not moot because discharge is a significant privilege reserved for honest debtors, and the UST is charged with protecting the integrity of the bankruptcy code. The Court also held that it does not have discretion to grant debtor a discharge if the UST can prove that Debtor’s conduct satisfies one of the enumerated exceptions to discharge stated in Section 707(a). Debtor’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

 

Judge David T. Thuma
Cause, Chapter 13, Standing, Statutory Construction, Valuation     12/23/2020     Sandra Joyce McGrath and Dale Allen Rogers     

Debtors’ mortgage holder moved for relief from the automatic stay, citing several ground for relief under § 362(d). The Court denied the motion and notably ruled that, because Debtors mortgage matured prior to bankruptcy, Debtors could potentially amend their plan to bifurcate and cramdown the movant’s claim and/or pay the claim via a balloon payment at the end of Debtors’ plan period.

 

Judge David T. Thuma
Automatic Stay, Chapter 11, Injunctions, Sanctions, Stay Violation     12/14/2020     Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe     

Debtor moved for sanctions and/or a finding of contempt against Debtor’s former employee for violation of the automatic stay. The Court found that Debtor’s structure as a corporation sole meant that employee’s post-petition suit against the Archbishop was stayed, but sanctions were inappropriate given the rarity of and the lack of authority on the issue.

 

Judge David T. Thuma
Chapter 11     12/11/2020     S-Tek 1, LLC, a New Mexico Limited Liability Corporation     

The Court granted the debtor’s request for use of cash collateral on an emergency basis, pending a final hearing on use of cash collateral. Before the bankruptcy filing, the debtor filed a lawsuit in state court against Surv-Tek, Inc., the business entity from which the debtor purchased its business.  Surv-Tek, Inc. filed a counter-claim and obtained a judgment from the state court ordering the debtor and its principals to cease and desist competing with Surv-Tek, Inc. The Court determined that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents a state court loser from seeking federal court review and rejection of the state court judgment, did not preclude the debtor from seeking an order for use of cash collateral in a subsequent bankruptcy case. In addition, the automatic stay precluded enforcement of the state court order. Surv-Tek, Inc. was granted adequate protection in the form of a replacement lien in property of the same time it had a lien on the petition date that the debtor acquired post-petition to the extent the combined value of the debtor’s accounts receivable, cash on hand, and other cash equivalents, was less at the end of the interim, emergency period, than the value of those assets on the petition date. 

 

Chief Judge Robert H. Jacobvitz
Adversary, Equitable Estoppel, Judicial Estoppel     12/11/2020     Celia Hougland v. Carlo Franco et al     

After a trial on the merits to determine the ownership of mineral rights as between the probate estates of a mother and son, the Court concluded that the disputed mineral rights are owned by the probate estate of the son.  In a 1996 deed, stating no reservations or exceptions of any mineral interests, Hipolito Franco’s parents conveyed 122 acres of property to him.  In 1998 Hipolito and his wife used the surface estate of property as collateral for a loan.  A survey of the property revealed an error in the metes and bounds description of the property in the 1996 deed.  The lender’s title commitment required a correction deed, which Hipolito’s mother (then widowed) signed.  The metes and bounds description in the correction deed was preceded by the phrase “surface estate only.” Relying on the “surface estate only” language in the correction deed and on other legally-ineffective documentation, Hipolito’s mother claimed ownership of the mineral rights for several years, while omitting them from her bankruptcy schedules in two chapter 7 cases.  A state court quiet title action pertaining to the mineral rights filed by Hipolito and his wife was removed to this court.  By the time a trial on the merits of ownership of the disputed mineral rights was held, Hipolito and his mother had died.  The Court held that the disputed mineral rights were conveyed to Hipolito in the 1996 deed.  The correction deed did not alter the nature of that conveyance.  Hipolito’s estate was not estopped from claiming ownership of the disputed minerals.  Principles of estoppel by deed and judicial estoppel would preclude his mother’s estate from claiming ownership of the disputed minerals.          

 

Judge David T. Thuma
Exemptions, Property of the Estate, Trustee     12/07/2020     Mary Suarez     

The chapter 7 trustee objected to Debtor’s claim of a homestead exemption in her residence on the ground that, having given a warranty deed, absolute in form, to the property to her daughter’s trust, Debtor no longer owns the property and the property is not part of the estate. Debtor asserted that, the warranty deed notwithstanding, she has an interest in the property that she may exempt from the bankruptcy estate under New Mexico law. The chapter 7 trustee did not dispute that Debtor and her daughter, as trustee of the Trust, had an oral agreement that Debtor could live in the property until her death. The Court concluded that the terms of the oral agreement did not merge into the warranty deed, that the oral agreement is enforceable despite the statute of frauds under the circumstances, and that, under the oral agreement, Debtor had a life estate interest that became part of the estate and is exemptible under New Mexico law.

 

Chief Judge Robert H. Jacobvitz
Exemptions     12/07/2020     Mary Suarez     

The chapter 7 trustee objected to Debtor’s claim of a homestead exemption in her residence on the ground that, having given a warranty deed, absolute in form, to the property to her daughter’s trust, Debtor no longer owns the property and the property is not part of the estate. Debtor asserted that, the warranty deed notwithstanding, she has an interest in the property that she may exempt from the bankruptcy estate under New Mexico law. The chapter 7 trustee did not dispute that Debtor and her daughter, as trustee of the Trust, had an oral agreement that Debtor could live in the property until her death. The Court concluded that the terms of the oral agreement did not merge into the warranty deed, that the oral agreement is enforceable despite the statute of frauds under the circumstances, and that, under the oral agreement, Debtor had a life estate interest that became part of the estate and is exemptible under New Mexico law.

 

Chief Judge Robert H. Jacobvitz
Automatic Stay     12/02/2020     Cheryl Thorp     

Creditors failed to satisfy their burden of establishing Debtor’s lack of equity   in property, but were entitled to relief from the automatic stay for “cause” based on the totality of the surrounding facts and circumstances. Debtor filed three prior   bankruptcy cases, had not made any payments to the creditors in four years, and appealed a state court foreclosure judgment without posting a supersedeas bond. Creditor’s lien   and right of first refusal contained in an agreement executed by the Debtor to obtain the property under the City of Santa Fe’s affordable housing opportunity program constituted an encumbrance against the property which survived the Debtor’s prior discharge, and,  assuming the agreement was an executory contract, rejection of the agreement did not terminate the contract. 

Chief Judge Robert H. Jacobvitz
Attorneys Fees, Judicial Liens - Avoidance, Professionals, Valuation     11/25/2020     Rito Bill Sanchez     

Debtor moved for the avoidance of a judicial lien encumbering his property. The Court ruled that on the petition date, Debtor’s house was worth less than the New Mexico homestead exemption, so the lien could be avoided entirely. Further, it would be a violation of the New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct for the lienholder, Debtor’s former attorney, to collect the judgment, as it was an unreasonable fee consisting primarily of accrued interest.

 

 

Judge David T. Thuma

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